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Abstract 
 
Using the accurate and extensive data available in the UK New Earnings Survey, this paper 
investigates the extent to which nominal wages are downwardly rigid and whether such 
rigidity interferes with necessary real wage adjustments when inflation is low.  Despite the 
substantial numbers of individuals whose nominal wages fall from one year to the next, we 
find that if long-run inflation is one percent higher, the number of individuals with negative 
real pay growth increases by around 1.4 percent.  This is controlling for the median and 
dispersion of the real wage change distribution.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
It is commonplace for economists to assert that nominal wages are downwardly rigid.  
However, a casual glance at the work of Smith (2000) for the UK or McLaughlin (1994) for 
the US immediately reveals that substantial numbers of individuals experience falls in 
nominal wages from one year to the next.  So is the downward rigidity of nominal wages 
simply a myth?  Not necessarily.  Even if many individuals have negative nominal wage 
rises, some people may still face a barrier at zero and this type of nominal rigidity could still 
generate significant real effects. 
Our purpose is to analyse the extent to which downward nominal wage rigidity 
influences actual real wage changes given equilibrium real wage changes, thereby interfering 
with the workings of the labour market.  We investigate this issue by making use of the fact 
that changes in equilibrium real wages are much less likely to involve negative nominal wage 
changes when inflation is high.  Consequently, the size of the distortion generated by 
rigidities at zero nominal wage changes will vary systematically with the overall inflation 
rate. 
Following a number of papers which use US panel data1, mainly the PSID, Smith 
(2000) studies the extent of downward nominal rigidity in Britain.  Using data from the 
British Household Panel Study for the 1990s, she finds that around 9 per cent of employees 
who remain in the same job from one year to the next have zero pay growth.  Smith puts 
around half of this down to measurement error (including rounding error).  Further, she also 
has to deal with the fact that her successive annual observations on pay are not necessarily 12 
months apart and she finds that a significant proportion of the group with zero pay growth are 
there because of 12-month contracts.  The problem here is that periodic contracting is part of 
the structure of nominal rigidity.  Indeed, the very existence of 12-month contracts is, itself, 
evidence of nominal rigidity and may interfere significantly with the efficient operation of the 
labour market, especially if inflation is high. 
In this paper, we are able to go considerably further than Smith (2000) and, indeed, 
the US studies, because we have very accurate pay data for a large panel of individuals over a 
long period (1975-99).  The accuracy of the data is particularly helpful because it enables us 
to focus on substantive issues rather than devoting our energies to confronting and attempting 
to resolve measurement error problems.  The data we use are taken from the UK New 
                                                                 
1 McLaughlin (1994), Lebow et al (1995), Akerlof et al (1996), Card and Hyslop (1996), Kahn (1997) and 
Altonji and Devereux (1999). 
2 
Earnings Survey (NES).  This is a 1 per cent sample of employees based on all individuals 
whose National Insurance number ends in the digits 14.  Since these numbers are issued 
prior to starting work and are retained for life, there is a large panel element in the data.  
Complete data on earnings are provided for every individual and cover a specific week in 
April for each year.  These data are provided by employers who are legally bound to 
comply and come directly from payroll records, which ensures a high degree of accuracy.  
The data cover hourly and weekly earnings plus detailed information on hours, overtime 
hours, age, occupation, industry, region and whether or not the individual was in the same 
job as in the previous year.  Note that she can be in a different job with the same employer.  
The measure of the nominal hourly wage rate we use throughout is the weekly pay of those 
whose pay is unaffected by absence excluding overtime pay divided by weekly hours 
excluding overtime hours.  We only consider full-time employees and the wage changes 
refer to the April to April movements in the hourly rate for each individual. 
In Figure 1, we present the distribution of nominal wage changes (in the form of 
proportional increases) for non-job changers in a period of high inflation, 1975-76 
(inflation:  18.8 per cent), medium inflation, 1986-87 (inflation:  4.4 per cent), low 
inflation, 1992-93 (inflation:  1.3 per cent).  In all three periods there is a distinct spike at 
zero but the spike is far more marked when inflation is low.  This immediately suggests 
that nominal wage rigidity may have real consequences because of the obvious distortion 
to the nominal (and hence real) wage change distribution.  We pursue this issue first by 
getting a picture of the distribution of nominal wage changes for a variety of different 
groups.  We then investigate the basic question of whether nominal wage rigidity interferes 
with necessary real wage adjustments.  The answer turns out to be yes but not much.   
 
 
2. A Picture of Nominal Wage Rigidity 1975-99 
 
In Table 1, we present some aspects of the frequency distribution of changes in basic 
hourly pay for individuals who stay in the same job.  The changes refer to a given week in 
April in every year.  Looking first at column 1 (no change in wages) we see that practically 
no-one has a constant nominal wage from one year to the next in the years of very high 
inflation (eg 1975-77 or 1979-81).  By contrast, in the low inflation years of the 1990s, the 
numbers reach a peak of over 7 per cent.  How do the 1990s numbers compare with those 
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reported by Smith (2000)?  In her Table 1, she reports that an average of 9 per cent of 
individuals had zero annual pay growth over the years 1991-96.  This compares with our 
average of 5.1 per cent over the same years (see Table 1, column 1).  Smith argues that 
around half of her numbers are due to measurement or rounding error, and if we exclude 
these, then our numbers are roughly comparable. 
In column 2, we see the percentage receiving nominal pay cuts, the numbers 
ranging from nine or 10 per cent in periods of high inflation to around 20 per cent in 
periods of low inflation.  These numbers are broadly comparable to those reported for the 
US (eg McLaughlin, 1994; Card and Hyslop, 1996) while being somewhat lower than 
those presented for the UK in Smith (2000), Table 1.  To see how the distribution of 
nominal wage changes is bunched around zero, we present the proportion of individuals 
whose wage changes lie in the 1 per cent interval centred on zero and those adjacent to it.  
Throughout the twenty four years of the sample, the interval centred on zero always 
contains around two to three times as many people as each of the surrounding intervals.  
This indicates again that the zero change has a particular status, even in periods of high 
inflation. 
 
Nominal Rigidity for Different Groups 
 
In Table 2, we present the same information as in Table 1 revealing the differences 
between men and women.  The proportions with zero nominal changes are generally 
slightly higher for men as are the numbers with falls in nominal pay.  This, at least in part, 
reflects the somewhat lower median wage increases for men.  Overall, the differences are 
not dramatic.  Turning to differences by skill, we find in Table 3 that higher skill men tend 
to have rather higher proportions with zero nominal changes as well as lower numbers 
with declines in nominal pay.  The latter reflects the higher median real wage shifts among 
the higher skilled whereas the former perhaps reflects a lower level of wage flexibility in 
this group. 
If we consider longer period changes, we would expect a marked decline in the 
numbers facing zero nominal wage changes and in Table 4 we see this is exactly what 
happens.  In most periods, fewer than 1 per cent of individuals in the same job have no 
change in nominal wages over two years.  These numbers are markedly lower than those 
reported in Smith (2000).  Using her measures, around 4 per cent of non-job changers had 
zero pay growth over two years in the first half of the 1990s, perhaps reflecting the 
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importance of measurement error in her data.  Finally, in Table 5, we report on the 
situation for job changers.  Perhaps surprisingly, there are still a small number with zero 
annual nominal pay changes, although it should be recalled that in our data job changers 
do not have to change firms, they merely have to change jobs within firms. 
To summarise, we have seen that year-on-year changes in basic hourly pay exhibit 
a bunching around zero, even in periods of high inflation.  Despite this, we have also seen 
that between 10 and 20 per cent of job stayers have falling hourly pay from one year to the 
next.  Indeed, even over two-year periods we find over 10 per cent of individuals have 
falling nominal pay in the low inflation 1990s.  While these facts are interesting, they do 
not reveal the extent to which the bunching of nominal pay rises at zero is symptomatic of 
a significant distortion of the structure of wages, particularly in periods of low inflation.  It 
is this issue which we pursue in the next section. 
 
 
3. Does Nominal Wage Rigidity Distort the Wage Structure? 
 
It is often argued that one of the benefits of having a positive rate of inflation is that it can 
ease necessary adjustments in relative wages in a world where nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid (see Tobin, 1972 or Yates, 1998 for example).  As we have seen, 
nominal wages are not rigid downwards but there is enough bunching of nominal wage 
changes at zero to make it worth pursuing the question of whether nominal rigidity is 
interfering significantly with the operation of the labour market. 
To do this we make use of the fact that if nominal rigidities at zero are important, 
then the distribution of real wage changes across individuals should be influenced by 
inflation, ceteris paribus.  By its very nature we would expect these effects to be apparent 
at the lower end of the distribution, so we focus on the proportion of real wage changes 
that are negative. 
In order to build up an analytical framework, we start by considering the factors 
that would impact on the proportion of real wage changes which are negative in the 
absence of nominal rigidity at zero.  First, it is obvious that the proportion of real wage 
changes that are negative would depend on the position of the real wage change 
distribution, which we capture by the median.  Furthermore, it is clear that the relationship 
between the proportion below zero and the median real wage change is not linear, although 
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it will generally be negative.  Second, since the median real wage change is nearly always 
positive (see Table 6), it is likely that the proportion of changes below zero will be 
positively related to the dispersion of the distribution (see Figure 2).  Third, even if the 
distribution of real wage changes is independent of inflation in the long run, if changes in 
inflation reflect surprises then they will impact on changes in real pay.  Typically a 
positive (negative) inflation surprise will lead to real wages being lower (higher) than 
planned.  This will, of course, operate via the median but if surprises influence wage 
changes differently at different parts of the distribution, because of more or less 
indexation, for example, then inflation changes could have an impact on the proportion 
negative. 
So if we control for all the above factors which we take to capture the effect of 
equilibrium real wage changes, what will be the ceteris paribus impact of inflation on the 
proportion of real wage changes which are negative?  In Figure 3, we illustrate the 
potential distortion caused by the existence of some degree of nominal rigidity around zero 
nominal wage changes.  The idea is that the introduction of a barrier around zero nominal 
wage changes will lead to some individuals being shifted from the area of real wage 
changes just below –p to the area just above.  The distortion involves the area A below -p 
being moved to the area B above -p.  Of course, the areas A and B are equal and it is clear 
that if inflation is low, so that -p is close to the zero line, then the distortion moves some 
individuals to the right of this line.  This will not happen when inflation is high because -p 
is far away from the zero line (see Figure 3).  This leads to a positive relationship between 
the inflation rate and the percentage of real wage changes which are negative. 
In order to investigate this relationship, we consider a time series regression whose 
dependent variable is the percentage of real wage changes which are negative.  The 
regressors include the median real wage change and its square, a measure of dispersion 
which we take to be the 75-35 percentile range and the level and change of the rate of 
inflation.  The use of the rather eccentric measure of dispersion is an attempt to use 
something which is not much affected by the nominal rigidity distortion which, in the 
main, all happens to the left of the 35th percentile.  In order to utilise more information we 
also consider pooled regional data since we have all the necessary information available at 
the level of the standard UK regions.  Of course, the regional time series relationships are 
not independent, so we allow for cross-correlation in the residuals by using the SURE 
method. 
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In Table 7, we report the regression results for men and women separately.  As we 
can see the overall impression is that the proportion of job stayers whose real wage change 
is negative is well explained by the position and dispersion of the real wage change 
distribution.  However, in addition, there is a strong positive inflation effect which is 
consistent with the distortion generated by having some degree of rigidity in the area of 
zero nominal wage changes.  Taking the average inflation coefficient from the four 
equations in Table 7, we find that a 1 per cent rise in the long-run rate of inflation will 
induce, in the long run, a ½ percentage point rise in the number of job stayers with a 
negative real wage increase.  On average, this reflects a 1.4 per cent increase.  So while 
this effect is statistically significant, it is hardly a very large one.  As an argument for 
raising the UK inflation target from 2.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent, say, it does not appear to 
be very strong. 
In Table 8, we see the same kind of inflation effect on the percentage of job stayers 
whose two-year real wage change is negative.  Furthermore, if we look at the percentage of 
job stayers whose annual real wage change is less than –5 per cent (as opposed to less than 
zero), we find exactly the same results with much the same inflation effect.  The question 
now arises as to whether the inflation effects are actually generated by a rigidity located at 
zero as opposed to some more generalised form of money illusion.  Looking again at 
Figure 3, we see that if we consider the percentage of real wage changes below -x per cent 
where x is above the range of inflation rates, then we should observe a negative 
relationship between this percentage and inflation.  Thus in the lower half of Figure 3, we 
see that when inflation is high, the distortion removes individuals from the left of -x.  
When inflation is low in the top half of Figure 3, the distortion is too far away from -x to 
have any impact.  This suggests that the type of distortion generated by the particular form 
of nominal rigidity based on zero nominal wage changes illustrated in Figure 3 will lead to 
the following particular structure of relationships. 
If we take the percentage of job stayers whose annual real wage changes are below  
–Y per cent where Y is towards the lower end of the sample range of inflation rates, this 
percentage will be positively related to inflation, ceteris paribus.  If Y is towards the upper 
end of the sample range, the percentage of job stayers whose annual real wage changes are 
below –Y per cent will be negatively related to inflation.  So what happens in practice?  
The answer is presented in Table 9.  We see that we have precisely the pattern suggested 
above.  As Y moves from the lower end of the sample range of inflation to the upper end, 
the coefficient on inflation moves systematically from positive to negative.  This suggests 
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that the nominal rigidity is indeed focused on zero nominal wage changes and induces a 
distortion in real wage changes of the type illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Using the accurate and extensive data available in the UK New Earnings Survey, we have 
undertaken an investigation of the extent to which nominal wages are downwardly rigid.  
Despite the substantial numbers of individuals whose nominal wages fall from one year to 
the next, we find that if long-run inflation is 1 per cent higher, the percentage of 
individuals with negative real pay growth increases by ½ percentage point (ie around 1.4 
per cent).  This is a statistically significant increase in flexibility which is ceteris paribus 
on the median and overall dispersion of the real wage change distribution.  However, 
despite its statistical significance, the overall effect is clearly modest and would not be a 
strong argument for raising the long-run inflation target. 
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Table 1 
Nominal Wage Rigidity, 1976-99 
 
Percentage of job stayers whose annual change in hourly pay falls in the given categories 
 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-
0.5%]  
(–0.5% 
;0.5%] 
(0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real wage 
change  
1976-75 0.29 5.11 0.43 1.03 0.49 18.84 4.20 
1977-76 0.57 10.04 0.87 2.33 1.41 20.49 -5.59 
1978-77 1.14 9.50 0.97 3.08 1.32 5.47 2.92 
1979-78 0.88 9.35 0.79 2.95 1.09 9.98 -0.15 
1980-79 0.20 5.06 0.35 0.80 0.46 21.82 4.47 
1981-80 0.99 10.14 0.76 3.41 1.07 12.03 3.48 
1982-81 1.20 9.90 0.90 3.92 1.29 9.34 1.34 
1983-82 2.05 10.63 0.91 3.27 1.38 5.73 4.16 
1984-83 4.59 12.75 1.15 6.21 1.75 3.43 1.78 
1985-84 1.64 11.60 1.06 2.96 1.48 6.95 1.11 
1986-85 1.36 12.30 1.08 3.36 1.39 3.10 4.39 
1987-86 2.50 12.05 1.16 3.91 1.62 4.36 3.09 
1988-87 1.55 11.43 1.01 2.64 1.39 4.00 3.57 
1989-88 1.98 10.86 0.96 3.13 1.28 7.95 1.42 
1990-89 2.28 10.59 0.94 3.47 1.35 9.52 0.51 
1991-90 2.77 11.09 0.93 3.87 1.24 6.50 4.07 
1992-91 5.03 13.13 1.21 6.63 1.84 4.19 3.41 
1993-92 7.13 16.25 1.73 9.42 3.30 1.29 2.90 
1994-93 6.48 19.38 2.19 9.44 6.40 2.56 0.50 
1995-94 5.48 19.47 1.78 8.03 2.98 3.28 0.08 
1996-95 1.32 18.20 1.61 6.44 2.41 3.11 0.09 
1997-96 1.49 22.38 1.92 7.71 2.85 1.79 2.37 
1998-97 3.92 18.66 1.49 6.10 2.22 3.90 -0.57 
1999-98 4.51 16.85 1.44 6.56 2.10 1.62 2.83 
 
Notes:  i) The first five columns refer to the percentage of individuals whose nominal wage changes fall in 
the categories described at the head of the column.  ii) The workers are full-time individuals who remain in 
the same job. 
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Table 2 
Nominal Wage Rigidity by Sex, 1976-99 
 
Percentage of job stayers whose annual change in hourly pay falls in the given categories 
 
ALL workers 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real wage 
change  
1975-80 0.62 7.85 0.69 2.05 0.96 15.31 1.32 
1980-85 2.11 11.01 0.96 3.97 1.40 7.50 2.33 
1985-91 2.08 11.38 1.01 3.40 1.38 5.91 3.12 
1991-95 6.02 17.01 1.72 8.36 3.60 2.85 1.97 
1995-99 2.83 18.95 1.61 6.68 2.39 2.77 1.78 
Average 
se  
0.05 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.05   
Men 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real wage 
change  
1975-80 0.59 8.82 0.74 2.07 1.02 15.31 0.97 
1980-85 2.19 12.16 1.04 4.05 1.45 7.50 2.12 
1985-91 2.27 12.72 1.09 3.70 1.49 5.91 2.70 
1991-95 6.51 18.40 1.77 8.94 3.60 2.85 1.64 
1995-99 3.26 19.97 1.62 7.25 2.34 2.77 1.72 
Average 
se  
0.07 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.06   
Women 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real wage 
change  
1975-80 0.70 5.35 0.53 1.99 0.82 15.31 2.04 
1980-85 1.94 8.40 0.77 3.78 1.27 7.50 2.71 
1985-91 1.67 8.54 0.85 2.77 1.13 5.91 3.99 
1991-95 5.09 14.41 1.62 7.26 3.60 2.85 1.54 
1995-99 2.06 17.10 1.58 5.65 2.46 2.77 1.89 
Average 
se  
0.09 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.08   
 
Notes:  i) These tables have the same form as in Table 1 but with averages taken over groups of years. 
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Table 3 
Male Nominal Wage Rigidity by Skill, 1976-99 
 
Percentage of job stayers whose annual change in hourly pay falls in the given categories 
 
Men Low skill level  
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.41 12.43 1.12 2.07 1.45 15.31 -0.02 
1980-85 1.99 16.65 1.42 4.15 1.84 7.50 1.37 
1985-91 1.70 17.22 1.45 3.39 1.84 5.91 2.36 
1991-95 3.91 24.51 1.86 6.78 4.74 2.85 1.03 
1995-99 2.48 25.28 2.18 6.02 2.89 2.77 1.43 
Average 
se 
0.21 0.62 0.20 0.32 0.24   
Men Low intermediate skill level 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.50 9.38 0.77 1.90 1.20 15.31 1.65 
1980-85 1.82 12.90 1.09 3.48 1.52 7.50 2.43 
1985-91 2.06 12.91 1.14 3.51 1.57 5.91 3.08 
1991-95 5.52 18.76 1.92 7.90 3.45 2.85 1.70 
1995-99 2.57 19.95 1.73 6.33 2.38 2.77 1.68 
Average 
se  
0.10 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.10   
Men High intermediate skill level 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.50 8.32 0.70 1.85 0.95 15.31 1.27 
1980-85 2.64 12.05 1.06 4.32 1.50 7.50 2.24 
1985-91 2.38 12.76 1.10 3.84 1.52 5.91 3.03 
1991-95 7.26 18.47 1.75 9.78 3.37 2.85 1.60 
1995-99 3.69 20.25 1.58 7.85 2.39 2.77 1.79 
Average 
se 
0.12 0.25 0.08 0.16 0.10   
Men High skill level 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.80 6.98 0.58 2.34 0.89 15.31 0.89 
1980-85 2.37 8.99 0.75 3.67 1.06 7.50 2.45 
1985-91 2.73 10.18 0.79 4.03 1.16 5.91 3.69 
1991-95 7.71 15.59 1.54 9.99 3.92 2.85 1.87 
1995-99 3.51 18.18 1.39 8.05 2.08 2.77 2.00 
Average 
se 
0.07 0.32 0.10 0.22 0.13   
 
Notes:  i) These tables have the same form as in Table 1 but with averages taken over groups of years. 
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Table 4 
Nominal Wage Rigidity over a Two Year Period, 1976-99 
 
Percentage of job stayers whose bi-annual change in hourly pay falls in the given categories 
 
ALL workers 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.09 3.79 0.31 0.48 0.37 30.06 1.11 
1980-85 0.17 4.91 0.36 0.62 0.48 18.91 5.27 
1985-91 0.26 6.07 0.46 0.80 0.57 12.26 5.59 
1991-95 1.38 11.33 0.95 2.53 1.34 6.59 5.10 
1995-99 0.84 13.65 1.02 2.58 1.36 6.06 2.25 
Average 
se 
0.03 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.04   
Men 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.09 4.35 0.34 0.54 0.43 30.06 2.56 
1980-85 0.19 5.60 0.40 0.69 0.53 18.91 6.09 
1985-91 0.31 6.99 0.53 0.93 0.65 12.26 6.63 
1991-95 1.63 12.59 1.03 2.85 1.44 6.59 4.57 
1995-99 1.03 14.48 1.05 2.87 1.35 6.06 2.13 
Average 
se 
0.04 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.05   
Women 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.06 2.26 0.20 0.31 0.22 30.06 0.55 
1980-85 0.12 3.23 0.28 0.44 0.28 18.91 4.93 
1985-91 0.15 3.87 0.28 0.49 0.38 12.26 4.95 
1991-95 0.87 8.82 0.79 1.90 1.14 6.59 6.00 
1995-99 0.48 12.07 0.98 2.03 1.40 6.06 2.51 
Average 
se 
0.04 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.06   
 
Notes:  i) These tables differ from the previous tables simply because all changes refer to two year periods.  
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Table 5 
Nominal Wage Rigidity Among those who Change Jobs, 1976-99 
 
Percentage of job stayers whose annual change in hourly pay falls in the given categories 
 
ALL workers 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.25 12.71 0.67 1.26 0.83 15.31 5.21 
1980-85 1.27 17.53 0.97 2.59 1.17 7.50 6.33 
1985-91 0.62 16.89 0.85 1.67 1.04 5.91 8.28 
1991-95 1.65 22.59 1.30 3.37 2.26 2.85 5.32 
1995-99 0.62 23.89 1.34 2.61 1.64 2.77 6.84 
Average 
se 
0.09 0.40 0.10 0.15 0.12   
Men 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.24 13.76 0.68 1.33 0.89 15.31 4.70 
1980-85 1.57 18.83 0.97 2.81 1.21 7.50 5.91 
1985-91 0.71 18.65 0.83 1.83 1.07 5.91 9.32 
1991-95 1.80 24.65 1.39 3.67 2.32 2.85 4.71 
1995-99 0.72 25.15 1.30 2.63 1.63 2.77 6.75 
Average 
se 
0.12 0.52 0.13 0.20 0.15   
Women 
 0 < 0 (-1.5%;-0.5%] (-0.5%;0.5%] (0.5%;1.5%] Inflation Median  
real 
wage 
change  
1975-80 0.27 10.35 0.66 1.11 0.67 15.31 6.29 
1980-85 0.69 15.09 0.96 2.16 1.10 7.50 7.05 
1985-91 0.51 14.01 1.05 1.23 0.95 5.91 7.53 
1991-95 1.85 19.38 1.16 2.91 1.72 2.85 6.09 
1995-99 0.48 21.94 1.39 2.59 1.64 2.77 6.99 
Average 
se 
0.14 0.62 0.17 0.23 0.18   
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Table 6 
Annual Real Wage Changes for Job Stayers, 1976-99 
 
 Percentage 
with negative 
real wage 
change 
Median real 
wage change 
35th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
( 75th-35th ) Real change 
at zero 
nominal 
change 
1976-75 33.17 4.20 0.53 12.69 12.17 -18.84 
1977-76 72.95 -5.59 -7.95 0.73 8.67 -20.49 
1978-77 72.95 2.92 0.26 10.31 10.06 -5.47 
1979-78 50.72 -0.15 -3.01 7.30 10.30 -9.98 
1980-79 32.52 4.47 0.69 13.95 13.13 -21.82 
1981-80 37.40 3.48 -0.80 12.33 13.13 -12.03 
1982-81 41.34 1.34 -0.94 7.61 8.55 -9.34 
1983-82 21.17 4.16 1.94 10.05 8.10 -5.73 
1984-83 36.16 1.78 -0.03 7.55 7.57 -3.43 
1985-84 42.92 1.11 -0.90 6.69 7.59 -6.95 
1986-85 19.14 4.39 2.39 10.51 8.11 -3.10 
1987-86 24.11 3.09 1.34 9.14 7.80 -4.36 
1988-87 25.33 3.57 1.03 10.90 9.87 -4.00 
1989-88 40.90 1.42 -1.04 9.31 10.35 -7.95 
1990-89 47.17 0.51 -1.39 7.36 8.75 -9.52 
1991-90 24.04 4.07 2.45 10.45 8.00 -6.50 
1992-91 26.68 3.41 1.25 8.72 7.48 -4.19 
1993-92 28.19 2.90 1.41 7.85 6.44 -1.29 
1994-93 44.25 0.50 -0.96 5.13 6.09 -2.56 
1995-94 49.22 0.08 -1.08 5.40 6.48 -3.28 
1996-95 49.49 0.08 -1.28 6.08 7.36 -3.11 
1997-96 28.06 2.37 1.30 8.42 7.13 -1.79 
1998-97 52.11 -0.57 -1.73 5.54 7.27 -3.90 
1999-98 24.91 2.83 1.36 8.84 7.47 -1.62 
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Table 7 
Explaining the Percentage of Job Stayers 
whose Annual Real Wage Change is Negative, 1976-99 
 
Dep Var:  Percentage with Negative Annual Real Wage Change 
 
 Men Women 
 Annual Data Annual/  
Regional Data 
Annual Data Annual/  
Regional Data 
 OLS SURE OLS SURE 
Median Real 
Wage Change 
(%) 
-05.12 
(13.8) 
-5.24 
(32.6) 
-4.37 
(5.9) 
-5.44 
(21.0) 
75th-35th  
Percentile 
Difference (%) 
0.071 
(0.1) 
0.485 
(3.6) 
1.19 
(1.5) 
0.921 
(6.2) 
Inflation Rate (%) 0.857 
(2.8) 
0.449 
(5.6) 
0.618 
(1.7) 
0.252 
(3.0) 
?inflation Rate -0.248 
(1.7) 
-0.089 
(1.6) 
0.016 
(0.1) 
-0.019 
(0.3) 
Region Dummies   
v 
  
v 
Observations 23 230 23 230 
R² 0.97 0.93 
(average) 
0.94 0.91 
(average) 
 
Notes:   
 
(i) t ratios in parentheses. 
 
(ii) The real wage is the nominal basic hourly rate normalised on the retail price index.  The 
median real wage change is measured as a percentage.  The 75th-35th percentile difference 
refers to the difference between the percentage real wage change at the 75th percentile less the 
percentage real wage change at the 35th percentile.  It is a measure of dispersion.  The inflation 
rate is the percentage rate and refers to the retail price index.  All changes are annual, April to 
April.  In the regional equations, the data are all region specific. 
 
(iii) The use of SURE for the regional panel takes account of the high cross-region correlations in 
the equation errors when computing the standard errors.  These correlations are generally in 
the range 0.5 to 0.8.  The R² refers to the average over the ten regional regressions.  
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Table 8 
Explaining the Percentage of Job Stayers Bi-Annual 
Real Wage Change is Negative, 1976-99 
 
Dep Var:  Percentage with Negative Bi-Annual Real Wage Change 
 
Annual/Regional Data:  SURE 
 
 Men Women 
Median Real 
Wage Change (%) (2 year) 
-4.98 
(29.3) 
-5.21 
(24.4) 
(Median)² 0.169 
(10.3) 
0.164 
(10.0) 
75th-35th 
Percentile Difference (%) 
0.915 
(10.0) 
0.870 
(8.2) 
Inflation Rate (%) 
(2 year) 
0.104 
(2.7) 
0.185 
(4.3) 
?Inflation Rate 0.023 
(0.6) 
-0.029 
(0.6) 
Region Dummies v v 
Observations 220 220 
R² (average) 0.91 0.93 
 
Notes:  As in Table 7, except the changes are over 2 years. 
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Table 9 
The Impact of Inflation on the Percentage of Job Stayers whose  
Annual Real Wage Changes are less than –Y%  
 
Inflation Coefficients in the Standard Regression (as in Table 7) 
 
-Y 0%  -5%  -10%  -15%  -20%  
      
Men 0.449 
(5.6) 
0.453 
(8.4) 
0.074 
(1.6) 
-0.026 
(0.9) 
-0.036 
(2.0) 
Women 0.252 
(3.0) 
0.400 
(7.4) 
-0.038 
(0.7) 
-0.050 
(1.8) 
-0.073 
(4.3) 
 
 
Notes: 
 
(i) These inflation coefficients are taken from SURE regressions whose independent variables are 
those in Table 7 and whose dependent variables are the percentage of job stayers whose annual 
real wage changes are less than –Y%.  Thus the first column presents the inflation coefficients 
reported in Table 7. 
 
(ii) t ratios in parentheses. 
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Figure 1 
The Distribution of Nominal Wage Changes 
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Fig 2.  Real Wage Changes: Increase in Dispersion
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Data Appendix 
 
Nominal Wages:  Weekly pay of those whose pay is unaffected by absence excluding 
overtime pay divided by weekly hours excluding overtime hours.  For a given week in 
April, annually.  UK New Earnings Survey. 
 
Prices:  Retail price index.  Available monthly in UK. Labour Market Trends. 
 
Skill Levels:  The four skill levels reported in Table 3 are based on the individual 
occupation.  Details may be found in Nickell et al. (1999). 
 
Prices (regional):  A Regional Price index for the UK is collected annually by the 
Regional Rewards Survey Ltd.  The company samples prices in approximately 100 British 
Towns and then produces a percentage comparison of prices in each region against the 
national average.  We use the national CPI to create regional CPI indices from these data. 
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